| |
1. INTRODUCTION
The problem of metaphysics, dressed in whatever form, is as old as human history, and yet it is an ever new problem which must somehow or other be confronted by anyone who reflects in depth on the vital issues of human life. The literature on the issue is amazingly abundant and this fact affords ample evidence that it is still in vogue. Many great thinkers have racked their brains in an attempt to find, once and for all, a definite solution, but more often than not they discovered more its mysteriousness than revealed the mystery itself.
Kant has certainly contributed a great deal to the history of reflection upon one fundamental issue, whether Metaphysics can be a Science. The Critique of Pure Reason, he says, "was intended to discuss the possibility of metaphysics". (1)
The title of this essay, hence, may appear at first sight to be immensely vast, for it almost includes the major part, if not the whole, of Kant's philosophy. However, what I want to stress here is his approach, by which I mean his initial preoccupation or disposition towards metaphysics and the way he adopted the primary assumptions for establishing the doctrine of the unknowability (of the thing-in-itself). With this new epistemological paradigm, Kant concludes that no metaphysics can attain to the status of Science. Such a claim, as I shall demonstrate, is grounded in his transcendental faith that the mind cannot even reach the existence of the thing-in-itself. This is to destroy every possibility of ontology, the study of being as being. I shall criticize the tenability of his agnostic position to see If any affirmation of being-in-itself is possible. This is crucial to the point at issue, for metaphysics without a solid ontology would be precarious. Thus at the end I try to show that his transcendental method (or approach) can be somehow integrated and lends itself to a sort of intuition of being which is a key to open the mysterious realm of beings-in-themselves.
Hundreds of commentators have made long and detailed comments on Kant's philosophy but the disputes among them show no guarantee that they understand him perfectly. There is still room for further clarification. Hence this essay, with its accent more on a synthetic than analytic presentation, aims at providing an initial step into the discussion of the point at issue.
2. KANT'S INITIAL PREOCCUPATION
In order to understand Kant's approach properly, we have to determine what sort of problem he has in mind to deal with. "A search for truth" would be far too general an answer. In the present context, I would confine myself to his initial preoccupation: The Critique "will therefore decide as to the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general, and determine its sources, its extent, and its limitsˇĐall in accordance with principles" (Axii) (2). This implies that Kant actually starts with an epistemological inquiry about the possibility of validly establishing some true metaphysical claims.
2.1 The Difficulty in Distinguishing between Metaphysical and Epistemological Inquiries
It is often said that everyone has his own view of metaphysics. William James, for example, regards it as an unusual obstinate effort to think clearly.(3) Not many people think likewise. Aristotelian metaphysicians would say that it is the science of being as being. Kant himself uses the term "metaphysics" in different senses. In a wider sense, it means the Transcendental Philosophy itself, while in a stricter sense it is understood as a Transcendental Science with objects of its own beyond the possibility of sense-experience (cf. B869-B870). Kant identifies the latter with Baumgarten's metaphysics, which Is defined as "Scientia prima cognitionis humanae principia continens''(4) It is the Science which contains the first principles of that which is within the comprehension of our knowledge. The chief objects of such a speculative metaphysics, for Kant, are the things-in-themselves and in particular, God, freedom and the immortality of the soul (cf. R874).
Now there arises immediately another problem: to what extent can we attain the truth from an inquiry into what-things-in-themselves-are? This at once becomes an epistemological problem which is concerned with the justification of our knowledge of what-things-are. In other words, the epistemologists are anxious to inquire about "what can I know?". This question, in its turn, arouses at once the metaphysical inquiry about "what is the foundation of the real?". Unless the latter inquiry is answered, we cannot even pose the question "to what extent do I know what is real?". However if I am not sure of this, how can I claim to know the foundation of the real? The vicious circle, as it were, seems to trap us into a perpetual self-closed skepticism. The distinction is not easy to draw between metaphysical and epistemological inquiries. They are so inextricably interwoven that in the discussion of one the other is bound to enter. Kant wants to find a breakthrough of this impasse.
2.2 The Disputes among Metephysicians
Kant shows that, throughout its history, philosophy has been onesidedly concerned with the metaphysical problem of what-things-are and keeps neglecting the problem of their knowability. Men have always been absorbed in the perennial wonder about what the universe as a whole is like. They have looked to speculative reason for light on this and each one has arrived at his own conclusion. There is not a single metaphysical view, as Kant points out, which all unanimously accept. Hence metaphysics appears to be an arena for endless combats, whereas Mathematics and Physical Sciences have, by and large, advanced more smoothly. However hard the metaphysicians try to replace the systems of others with what they think is genuine knowledge, such attempts, for Kant, have been doomed to failure, because the source of the disputes is still very problematic, especially regarding the assessment of the nature of genuine knowledge.
Knowledge in Kant's context is something more than mere beliefs.
"If our holding of the judgment be only subjectively sufficient, and is at the same time taken as being objectively insufficient, we have what is termed believingˇKwhen the holding of a thing to be true is sufficient both subjectively and objectively, it is knowledge" (B850).
In the Prolegomena, he further states that "everything to be known a priori (must be) apodictically certain", ˇKand hence ought not contain probable but perfectly certain judgments'. (5)
According to Kant, never has there been any metaphysics that contains judgments so perfect that it is not challenged by the skeptics or can be completely exempted from doubt.
2.3 Kant's Aim of Settling the Disputes
However, the skeptics have also been unable to prevent philosophers from attempting metaphysics anew, because skepticism itself is incapable of being established authoritatively (cf. B388ff). Hence the combat between dogmaticism (metaphysical theories) and skepticism would seem to have been unending until Kant's criticism appeared.
Kant divides his philosophical development into three stages; dogmaticism, skepticism and criticism, as he sees these phases exemplified not only in the historical process in general but also in his own mental evolution. He begins with the dogmatic rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff, then calls this doctrine in question with the aid of Hume's empirical skepticism and gradually arrives at his own critical standpoint.:
Metaphysics, Kant holds, after having for so many centuries been nothing but a process of merely random groping, has not yet had the good fortune to enter upon the secure path of a science (cf. Bxivf).
For Kant, the best way to settle the disputes among metaphysicians is to determine the limits of knowledge beyond which the human mind cannot go. Hence he sets forth the problem in question in the Critique as: "How is metaphysics, as science, possible?" (B22). Note that his primary concern is not only with the truth or falsity of a particular system of metaphysics but also with the possibility of discovering how the truth or falsity of any metaphysical claim whatsoever can be sustained.
|