V THE DIALOGUE

There are three basic questions that must be answered in our search for the meaningfulness of the proposition we have put forth. The first of these asks if this is an analytic proposition, the second asks if this is a synthetic proposition and the third asks if the grammatical construction used is a proper one. If the answer to our first question is yes, then our proposition is meaningful in so far as it is capable of being proven true or false but it would be less than satisfactory for what we are about because we would be speaking of something meaningful only in the logical order and not in the order of life, the order of history. If the answer to our second question is yes, then our proposition is capable of being proven true or false by experience and therefore meaningful in the order of life, the order of history. But if the answer to our second question is yes, it is not complete unless our third question can also be answered yes and verified by a prudent judgment. What we are judging is that our grammatical construction is indeed a proper one in so far as substantives do signify what can be pointed to and not some construct of my own imagination.

Now the first question can be answered quite simply. If there is a logical connection between the two terms of my proposition－that is, an intrinsic connection－then the negation of my propositon will be a contradiction. Thus, the proposition 'A rainy day is a wet day'－an analytic proposition because wet is contained in the idea of rain－is most clearly verified when we see that to state its negative is an obvious contradiction. But to say that common human experience does not lead to religious language is no more a contradiction than to say that is does. Thus we can easily answer no to our first question. Now since this is so, the answer to our second question will have to be yes if our proposition is going to be a meaningful one. That is, we are saying that our proposition is a synthetic statement that can be verified either directly or indirectly by experience. And since we are talking about something each one of us is capable of experiencing here and now, we are saying that our proposition can be verified by direct experience. What this means is that our proposition is like the statement 'The dog is in the yard '. To verify the truth of that statement we would simply go and look in the yard; to verify the truth of our proposition, we simply take our models, look into ourselves and do our own reflecting on our similar experiences.

In all of our models, looking into our own similar experience and reflecting on it would－in my prudent judgment－bring us to similar conclusions. Along with Langdon Gilkey, I see that I am faced with choices I must make in life and that I cannot make these decisions without some referent, some model. There is an ultimate, therefore, to which my decisions point. Also I see that I have trouble incarnating into my life the person I want to be so that there is a gap between what I want to be and what I am. With Karl Rahner I experience transcendence in my life and the responsibility and freedom that flows from this. In the light of this responsibility and freedom, I experience a deep sense of dependence along with the realization that I do not really control my final disposal. And finally, along with Karl Rahner I do arrive at the point of mystery. With Chu Mei-Fen I can understand and appreciate the experience of Mao Tsetung and agree that his experience does show self-transcendence and a dimension of ultimate concern. So my conclusion is that given the common experience outlined in the models, I do come to the point where I speak of a dimension of ultimacy, of transcendence, of mystery. My proposition is indeed a synthetic proposition that my own experience can demonstrate as true.

But the final question remains and that is a big one. Can I call all these end-points that flow from reflecting on my common experience, religious experiences and thus my talking about them religious discourse and at the same time be true to the ordinary principles of grammar? The reason that this is such an important question is because it is right at the heart of the analytic philosopher's questioning of the meaningfulness of the classical argument from experience for the existence of God. The argument is based on the fact of order in nature and that this order or regularity in nature constitutes sufficient evidence for the existence of God. But, says the analytic philosopher, in this case the statement 'God exists ' means no more than there is a certain requisite regularity in nature and no religious man would admit that this was all he intended in asserting the existence of God. He would say that in talking about God, he is talking about a transcendent being who might be known through the manifestation of order in the universe but certainly could not be defined in terms of this manifestation.(14) This is the same problem that we are faced with here. If we are willing to define religious experience and religious discourse in terms of a dimension of ultimacy, transcendence and the presence of mystery, then our proposition is grammatically correct, If, however, we are unwilling to define religious experience and religious discourse in these terms but say that these manifestations merely point us in the direction of religious experience and of religious discourse, then we are not making a proper use of grammar in so far as the substantives we are using do not point to observable phenomena but rather to some imaginative position. In the final analysis, then, the question gets right down to an individual one. It is obvious that Langdon Gilkey, Karl Rahner and Chu Mei-Fen would define religious experience and religious discourse at least at a certain level in terms of the experienceable dimension of ultimacy, transcendence and the presence of mystery. The question that each must ask himself is: would I?

In answering this question, it must be kept in mind that the religious expression our authors are talking about is what they would consider a preliminary one and therefore not a complete one. That is, each would recognize that he or she has demonstrated a preliminary point in the context of the scientific world. But each would also hold that religious experience and a fortiori religious expression, is much larger than the scientific world and therefore its full meaning must be sought in a much broader context. For the Christian, that context is revelation. Thus, all men either consciously or unconsciously experience the preliminary, the incomplete, the scientific religious experience but only some－and always consciously－experience the complete, the revelational, the faith religious experience.

14)This famous argument is found in A.J. Ayer, LANGUAGE TRUTH & LOGIC, p. 115.